DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE INVESTIGATIONS

RECORDED TRANSCRIPTION

X ----- X

INTERVIEW OF

Mr. Robert Contee

March 17, 2021

This is a privileged document which contains CONTROLLED UNCLASSIFIED INFORMATION (CUI) that may be exempt from release under the Freedom of Information Act. The document and information contained therein may not be released, in whole or in part, without written permission of the Deputy Inspector General for Administrative Investigations, Office of Inspector General, Department of Defense.

PROCEEDING

Today is March 17, 2021. The time is 2:04
p.m. My name is and with me today is
We are investigators with the Department of
Defense Office of the Inspector General. With us today is Mr.
Robert Contee, Acting Chief of Police, D.C. Metropolitan Police
Department. Present with Mr. Contee is his Chief of Staff
, Assistant Chief Mr. Jeff Carroll, and Executive
Director and from
the Mayor's Office of General Counsel are also present on this
call. As we discussed before going on tape we are conducting a
review of DoD's involvement leading up to and during the events
in the District of Columbia and at the U.S. Capitol on January
6th, 2021. We are conducting this interview telephonically. I am
located in and is located in . Mr.
Contee and his staff with the exception of are located
in the District of Columbia. is located in Maryland. Mr.
Contee, please acknowledge that you are aware we are recording
this interview.
MR. CONTEE: I'm aware.

Okay. Also please acknowledge that I you received a copy of the DoD IG Privacy Act Notice.

MR. CONTEE: I have received it.

Okay. I'll now administer the oath. Please raise your right hand.

Whereupon: 1 2 ROBERT J. CONTEE, III 3 was called as a witness, placed under oath, and testified as follows: 4 5 EXAMINATION 6 BY 7 Q: For the record please state your full name and spell your last name? 8 A: Robert James Contee, III. Last name is C-O-N-T-E-E. 9 10 Q: Also for the record, please state the position you held 11 on January 6th, 2021. 12 A: Acting Chief of Police Metropolitan Police Department, 13 Washington D.C. 14 Q: All right, sir. When did you start your term as Acting 15 Chief? 16 A: January the 2nd, 2021. 17 Q: All right, sir. And are you still serving in that 18 capacity? A: I am. 19 20 Q: All right, sir. Sir, the first section of questions 21 that I'd like to go over is some general coordination between your office and the D.C. National Guard. Can you please tell us 22 23 about your or the D.C. Metropolitan Police Department's general

A: Yes. Our general coordination when there's a need for

or daily coordination with D.C. National Guard?

24

the National Guard to be activated in the District of Columbia, we normally discuss what the operational needs are for the city.

Those requests are then sent to our Director of Emergency

Management Office. Homeland Security and Emergency Management

Agency. That request is then I guess on behalf of the Mayor and the District of Columbia is then sent to the National -- D.C.

National Guard for the National Guard to consider the request that we send.

- Q: Okay, sir. Is that process codified in writing anywhere?
- A: I'm not sure if it's codified in writing anywhere.

 That's what we do, what we have been doing. That's been the practice but I'm not sure. I don't know that it's codified anywhere in any MPD regulation, but that's the process. So that's the practice that we generally abide by.
- Q: Yes, sir. And just to confirm I understood that correct, if you identify a need for National Guard support you submit that over to the D.C. Department of Homeland Security Office, correct?
 - A: That's correct.

2.0

- Q: Do you have a specific point of contact at the D.C.

 National Guard that you coordinate with as a part of your routine duties at all?
- A: Normally when we are having conversations it's me or one of my -- my Assistant Chief over at Homeland Security, Jeff

Carroll, would normally coordinate with General Walker or whoever is there at the D.C. National Guard. In the past there's been other generals, General Schwartz and a few other -- one or two others, but generally it's the Chief of Police or the Homeland Security Chief who coordinates with them.

Q: Does that coordination take place in the pre-approval stages or is that post-approval?

A: Most of the time I think it's a little bit -- it's been a little bit of both because, I mean, just out of courtesy a heads up with respect to what the ask is going to be because we know that our Guardsmen, you know, they're not necessarily at the ready, and we try to get as much lead time as we possibly can that a request will be coming up the chain. So, and then obviously once those requests are approved there's a lot more coordination that takes place in terms of exactly where people will be for whatever the mission is, whatever the operation is. In the past the inauguration, 4th of July, those types of deployment. We have operational plans for that and those plans will outline which traffic posts as an example will be covered by D.C. National Guard.

Q: Okay, sir. Sir, my next question was going to be related to the type of events that National Guard typically would provide D.C. Metro PD support for, but you indicated inaugurations and things such as that. Are there any other types of things?

A: Yeah. We have the National Guard has been here as part
of our COVID response here in the city. They've been here for
that a number of just demonstrations that we've had before. When
it snows as an example we'll send in requests because they'll
send a HMMWV to assist with getting officers to assignments. I
mean, those are generally the things that we request their
support for, traffic obviously, and those kinds of things, but we
do make those requests.

- Q: Understood, sir. What is the average time would you say from the time you submit a request through Department of Homeland Security until you receive a response from National Guard?
- A: You know, my personal knowledge I think it depends.

 Again I've been in an acting role since January 2nd. This event happened on January the 6th. My Assistant Chief of Homeland Security has a more frequent interaction with them with respect to these requests and it really kind of depends --
 - Q: Okay. Can you --

- A: -- on how soon we get a response back.
- Q: Understood, sir. Can you describe any requirements that exists regarding National Guard providing support to Metro PD?
- A: Requirements? Requirements in terms of things that we've asked for in the past you mean?
- Q: Well, yes, sir. Specifically with regards to what they can and can't do.
 - A: So, when we request them if I understand your question

correctly, we'll give a specific mission request and we are told by the National Guard what they can and cannot do. For example I'll say for inauguration for example we'll say, "We need three quick response force platoon. This is what the need is." And they'll say either we can or cannot support that. So, sometimes we're very specific about what that requirement is. It's a requirement sometimes, you know, is it an armed requirement or not? Is it a civil disturbance unit type of response or not? So that's again one of those things it kind of depends on what we happen to be dealing with, what the situation is. If it's a typical 4th of July and it's just a traffic control type response we'll say, "We have X amount of traffic posts." And their response whoever it would be, "All right. In order to fulfill this request it's going to take 300 Guardsmen to fulfill this request because of logistics in terms of transporting people, and relief factor, all that kind of stuff." We kind of just give the mission and then like I said they're able to kind of tell us what their able to do and what it's going to take to fulfill the mission.

- Q: Okay. Understood. Understood. Sir, can you explain your knowledge for how the Capitol Police Board factors into the request process?
 - A: For the D.C. National Guard for us?
- 24 Q: Yes, sir.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.0

21

22

23

25

A: They don't. They have absolutely nothing to do with

1	when Washington D.C when Washington D.C. requests the
2	National Guard. They absolutely have nothing to do with that.
3	That's a totally separate request and they're not mutually
4	independent of each other, or anything like that.
5	Q: Okay. There's no
6	A: Or they're not mutually dependent. I'm sorry. They're
7	not mutually dependent on each other.
8	Q: Yes, sir. I understood. So, there's no consultation
9	that occurs between the D.C. government and the CPB if I
LO	understand
1	A: No.
L2	Q: it correctly? Okay. Perfect.
L3	A: Yeah, that's correct.
L 4	Okay, sir. do you have any
L5	questions for that section?
L6	No questions.
L7	BY BY
L8	Q: Sir, now I'd like to kind of move onto the coordination
L9	with the National Guard prior to January 6th regarding the
20	Ellipse rally. Can you please explain the process that you or
21	Metro PD used to request National Guard support leading up to
22	January 6th protests at the Ellipse?
23	A: So the Ellipse falls on the National Park Service. So,
24	any request for National Guard specifically for that area would

fall under the jurisdiction of the National Park Service and U.S.

Park Police. The only coordination with MPD would be for city traffic posts that potentially impacts that area, but if it's down on National Mall property, in this case you're talking about the Ellipse, that's U.S. Park Police that would be their request not ours.

- Q: Okay, sir. So specifically for the protest, the large gathering can you speak to that with regards to the support that was requested?
- A: Yeah, that was all Park Service so we didn't request National Guardsmen for that specific protest that you're referring to.
- Q: But you did if I understand correct request support for traffic and things of that nature. Is that correct?
- A: Yeah, so but that wasn't -- yes. So, in response to the protest on the D.C. streets we did request National Guard assistance to assist us with traffic control as well as crowd management, that's correct.
 - Q: Okay. Can you tell us who --
- A: When you said -- I'm sorry. When you say protest and you're kind of throwing me off a bit. Speaking specifically about the Ellipse because again that's kind of separate in park, but specifically for our streets just to be clear, we did make a -- we made an MPD request to the National Guard for support for traffic and for crowd management.
 - Q: Yes, sir. I apologize for that. I could have phrased

that question better. Can you tell us how those requests for the traffic aspects were made and who made them?

A: Yeah, so we spent our half with what our practice has been. We send our half, MPD, sent our half as long with the Fire Department actually to our Director of Homeland Security

Emergency Management Agency Director Chris Rodriguez. He formulated the letter to include whatever the needs of MPD as well as D.C. Fire, whatever those needs are, and then he sends that on behalf of the city to the D.C. National Guard asking for their assistance. After they received the letter obviously there's a decision that's made and then that -- whatever that decision is normally communicate back to us here at MPD. It's normally communicated back to us here at MPD. It'n not sure if they talk to Director Rodriguez but I know that I had conversations. For January 6th when that request was sent out the decision that was made was communicated directly back to me.

- O: Okay, sir. Do you know when you --
- 18 A: That was the initial --

- Q: Oh, I'm sorry. Go ahead. Go ahead please.
- A: I was just going to say the initial decision to if you will.
- Q: Okay. Do you know when that request was sent to Director Rodriguez?
- A: The day that it was sent? There's a memo with that on there and I don't recall, let me see might have in here

1 somewhere. When we initially sent it. There's a memo with the date on there. I know that it was -- I seem to recall it being 2 3 like after Christmas sometime around like after Christmas but I don't know the exact date that the memo arrived over there. 4 5 Q: Okay, Sir. Would you be willing to share that memo if we contacted your Chief of Staff? 6 7 The memo that we sent to -- the one that we sent to **A**: Director Rodriguez? 8 9 Q: Yes, Sir. 10 **A**: Oh, absolutely. Yeah, we can share that. O: Okay. Perfect. Now, with regards to this request do you 11 12 recall what specifically was requested? 13 **A**: Support. There were no numbers attached to it. Again we tell them what the mission is we articulate the mission. In 14 response to articulating the mission they tell us this is the 15 16 number that it's going to require to fulfill the mission. 17 O: Okay. Whenever they provided you the support was the support consistent with what you actually needed? 18 19 Was a support consistent with what we needed? **A**: 2.0 Q: Yes with what was requested. And this is -- This is 21 prior to January 6. Not on January 6. We understand there some exigent circumstances there. 22 23 A: Yes. But not initially. They did ultimately supply us

Q: Okay. Can you speak to that, sir?

with what we needed, but that was not the initial -- response.

24

A: Sure. So, I believe that it was on the 31st somewhere
thereabout. It was definitely right before the New Year. I'm
thinking it was the 31st. It may have been on the 1st of 1
January. I received a call directly from the Secretary of the
Army Ryan McCarthy and at that time at that point he had
reviewed our request for the support of D.C. National Guard, and
what he relayed to me this phone call was not what I initially
thought that he would saying. He did not initially say, "Yes, you
get the National Guard responding and they're going to handle
this traffic and crowd management that you asked for that they're
going to be responding to handle it." That was not what was
stated. What was stated to me was that he was not inclined to
fulfill the request with Guardsmen simply because the optics of
it was bad. He said that he did not want to have boots on the
ground on the he didn't want to have boots on the ground
anywhere near the Capitol is what was stated. Again our request
was for crowd management and traffic control posts. So he said he
didn't want to have boots on the ground anywhere in near the
Capitol. And I certainly explained to him that I understood the
optics of it, and I understood what his concern was, but he
offered as a compromise that he could get us he could get the
D.C. government, that he could get us several police officers, or
federal he didn't say police officers he said federal officers
that he could get federal officers to fulfill this request
instead of the National Guard. I thanked him kindly for that,

however I told him that that was not our ask specifically for
federal officers based on our experience in the past with the
deployment of federal personnel specifically looking at the
Bureau of Prison personnel that have been deployed on our streets
before. In addition to that FBI agents who were deployed on the
streets of the District of Columbia walking around with long guns
who were not trained in civil disturbance response just was not
something that we wanted to do here in our city for what we were
dealing with. The city had actually and I relayed this to them as
well we did actually requested additional police officers from
surrounding jurisdictions outside of the District of Columbia to
be staged physically in the District of Columbia as well as a
contingent of police officers from the Virginia State Police to
be stationed outside the District of Columbia should they be
needed to respond in. So the law enforcement piece was pretty
well covered in our estimations of what we were dealing with. The
National Guard piece of this was to ensure that they covered
crowd management, traffic control piece so that we would not have
uniformed police officers manning these traffic and they would be
able to respond to any situation that we had on D.C. streets that
we would have police officers available to respond to those
situations and in the areas where we had concerns. Obviously with
January the 6 happening the way that it did the Capitol obviously
was an obvious area of concern but again that's Capitol Police.
Our concern and purposes for requesting the D.C. National Guard

was for what was happening on D.C. streets. So again when I had
this conversation and he offered that response that with the
federal police officer that is not something that we wanted to do
certainly without any coordination or anything like that. I was
told I told the Secretary of the Army, I told him that I had
a press conference on Monday and at that press conference
certainly I would be asked whether or not we had requested
service of the National Guard. He told me in response to that,
well, he when he asked what I told him we would be having a
press conference and I would have to answer that question. In his
response to that he told me to give them until Monday he was
going to be meeting with the Secretary of Defense. He also told
me that he asked me what time the press conference was. I told
him that it was 11:00 o'clock. He told me that he would call me
before the press conference which he did. He said he would call
me before 11:00 o'clock but that he wanted to have a conversation
with the SecDef is what he said. "I want to have a conversation
with SecDef about this whole optics, boots on the ground thing."
That was obviously a concern for him. We ended our call. I heard
back from him at about 1045-ish somewhere around that about 15
minutes before my press conference because in fact I was a couple
of minutes late because I was talking on the phone with Secretary
at that point. The Secretary he relayed to me that he spoken to
the SecDef. That the request for the National Guard had been
approved and he told me what the resource allocation would be. He

told me it was a number 300 and something but he broke the
number down specifically like X amount of on traffic posts, X
amount for crowd management at this Metro station, at that Metro
stations and that they would be working like 12 hour shifts. So
he gave me he told me what number was going to be for their
deployment. In addition to that what he told me was that their
mission is not to change, and if their mission were to change
that that would have to be approved by the Secretary of Defense
and that I would need to reach out to him directly in order for
their mission to change. And he also said to me that, "They're
not to go anywhere east of 9th Street." Is what he said.
"Anywhere east of 9th Street they should not be deployed anywhere
east of 9th Street. So, in our operational plan that we had for
January 6th obviously all of their posts are 9th Street back
towards 18th Street covering from K Street, or L Street on down
to the area of the National Mall. So we complied with
certainly with what we were asked to do. There was a situation
there was a situation on the I think it may have occurred
like on the 5th where we moved one of the Guardsmen like moved
the traffic points like literally like across the street, and
shortly thereafter my Assistant Chief received a call from
General Walker just kind of reinforcing like, "Hey, if you guys
move anybody we have to get approval for that." And again that's
kind of odd because we worked with the Guard hundreds of times
before and moving a person from one corner to the next never

required approval from the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of Defense for that matter. The general from the D.C. National Guard or even at a lower level normally is who we would be dealing with. So, that was kind of odd but it was certainly reinforced with my Assistant Chief.

- Q: Did the Secretary of the Army -- well one, can you tell me about what time day that first phone call took place?
- A: It was in the -- it was kind of -- it was in the evening time because I was at home. I don't recall the exact time. I just know that it was in the afternoon maybe early evening when we had the phone call.
- Q: Okay. Was the context contents of that phone call documented any way?
 - A: No.

- Q: Okay. Were there any other people present on the call that you're aware of?
- A: No, not on the call. He called from his cell phone. He had 703 number I believe. I'm assuming -- well I talked to him quite a bit on that number once everything kind of happened on January 6th and he -- he called from that number. He never mentioned that it was like a bridge or somebody else was setting it out. I was under the impression that it was like his -- a cell phone.
- Q: Okay. Yeah, I just want to be sure. Now, you said that during the telephone call at 10:45 prior to your news conference

that he reinforced a bunch of restrictions that were being place.

Did he give any reason why?

1

2

3

4

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

A: No. He didn't say any reason why. My thought, my understanding was that it was really just kind of build out that this was a compromise. Right? This is the build out from the conversation on the 31st. When we were talking about optics, we were talking about boots on the ground. We're just having that discussion. It's not a good look. These are Soldiers. All that kind of thing. And then just again that was the request because it was not -- as of the 31st we did not have approval for the National Guard and I communicated the same to the Mayor of the District of Columbia. I communicated that to the Mayor even now that I think about that morning I would not have an answer still until somewhere around the time of our press conference. So, my understanding of the restrictions were like this is the compromise, okay? So we don't want the Bureau of Prisons and these guys. We're going to give you the National Guard but here are kind of the rules, right? Here are the parameters.

Q: Okay. All right. Were there any other conversations that you had with DoD folks prior to January 6 other than the Secretary and Major General Walker?

A: Most of my conversations were with the Secretary. On the day of the press conference I think that there may have some members of the staff, he has I guess a group of people that he normally -- that normally travels with him. His attorney or the

General Counsel I guess for the military and a couple of other folks, public information person, but I think at various times like we would be holding on a call and they say, "The Secretary would join us in a second." So, I can only assume that there were — at least on that phone call that there were other people around. My Chief of Staff he was sitting next to me when we had the call the day of the press conference, and where we talked about what the parameters were discussed about where they could not go and if we moved them what we needed to do to do that. He was here. He was present for that one listening.

Q: Okay. But just to confirm that didn't that did strike you as odd and outside of the norm so far as placing restrictions on where they could be, no further east the 9th Street and what have you.

A: Oh absolutely --

Q: Is that correct?

A: -- it struck me as odd because normally we don't have those types of restrictions when we're talking about deploying the National Guard but the other piece of that I mean we're at the 11th hour and so I wasn't -- I needed the National Guard. If I had to take them and -- we worked around the plan basically.

Yes, sir. Understood. do you any questions for that section?

BY

Q: Just one question for you, Chief. And unfortunately we

didn't provided to you because we didn't think we'd be covering that but, on January 5th Mayor Bowser sent a memo to the Acting Attorney General, Secretary McCarthy, and Acting Secretary Miller and it talks about not requesting anymore law enforcement support. Are you familiar with that letter?

A: Yeah. You've got to keep on reading past that part though. There's another piece to that after not requesting law enforcement support I think it also says without coordinating with, basically her Chief of Police which is the Park and most of the people that's missing we had a discussion about that but yes, I am familiar with that.

Q: Okay. That is the memo. My question for you though is do you know how that letter came about?

A: I can tell you that -- I can tell you what I believe how it came about. I believe that I communicated back to the Mayor that it was Secretary McCarthy's intent to perhaps instead of deploying the National Guard send Bureau of Prisons and other folks to our city that we had not requested. So I believe that's how the memo came about. I mean there were a lot of conversations that were going on but I believe that's how the memo came about. Again this is based off of experience over the course of several months of dealing with unrest in the city. You know, when we have federal law enforcement agencies running around without nametags, badges, identifying insignia, running around with long guns we don't know who's who, and again I think the Mayor point was --

the point that the Mayor was making obviously she can speak for herself, but the point in terms of coordinating with law enforcement I have 3,600 police officers out here. I don't need men running around with long guns and me not know who they are. Are they law enforcement or not? So, that was obviously very concerning for us. So, I'm sure after relaying that that's probably what generated the memo.

Okay. Thank you. That's all.

BY

2.0

Q: All right, sir. Just moving on to the coordination with National Guard that took place on January 6th regarding the riots at the Capitol. Can you talk to us about what happened during January 6th events that resulted in the request for National Guard support?

A: So, around 1258-ish we received a call from the Chief of Police for the U.S. Capitol Police, Steve Sund and he was requesting — he had asked me, talked to us in advance but this particular day when he was calling he was asking if we could deployed MPD personnel to the grounds of the Capitol because one, we're not allowed to be there unless we're invited, but he asked for our office to respond because the demonstrators at that point had reached the west front of the Capitol. The bike racks stands that they had up they had breached that and had started up the hill to the inaugural stands that were being erected they are. So we deployed MPD personnel there and obviously our officers as

soon as they got there they engaged with the U.S. Capitol Police
officers in an effort to try to prohibit the demonstrators at
that point I mean things are really getting ugly and turning into
a riot, but to prohibit them from gaining access to the Capitol
building itself. They were already on the ground but this is the
actual building itself. While all this is going on at some point
I make it back from the west front of the Capitol with my Chief
of Staff with me, make it back here to MPD Headquarters, and
while back here at MPD Headquarters we are obviously it's a lot
of stuff going on, coordinating with all entities that are
involved at what's happening at the Capitol, and I was trying to
speak to the I wanted to speak to the Capitol Police Chief
just to make sure that we were giving him what he needed and that
we were also monitoring what we needed to monitor in the city
because again that's our primary responsibility what's happening
in the city. So, I was unable to reach him on the phone calling
directly to his cell, but Director Rodriguez at some point after
the 2:00 o'clock hour he was able to have him on the phone and
several members of the Army. I'm not sure who all the people were
on the phone. I know Chief Sund was on the phone, and I know that
representative from the Army was on the phone but I don't believe
Secretary McCarthy was on that call. I'm just not really sure who
all, I think this was some of his people who are in his circle to
assist him were on the phone but I got kind of pulled away from
overseeing what was happening in our command center because they

were all on this call I wanted to be part of obviously the
coordination effort that I'm assuming was taking place on this
call. What I heard on the call was Chief Sund pleading, he was
pleading. I know this man. He was pleading for the assistance of
the National Guard to be deployed to the grounds at the Capitol.
Whoever's on the call representatives from the Army it was more
of the conversation that I had had with Secretary McCarthy back
on the 31st, it was more along the line of, the 31st of the 1st,
whichever day it was. It may have been the 1st I can't remember
but it was more along the lines of talking about optics, talking
about boots on the ground. The same stuff that we had already
talked about it was kind of being rehashed on this call and they
were very emphatic about, "What's the plan? What's the plan?" And
I kind of maybe I got a little frustrated at that point but I
was like, "Hey, hey. Hold on. Wait, wait, wait a minute. Wait a
minute." I asked Chief Sund very emphatically I said, "Chief
Sund, let me make sure I understand this correct. Are you asking
for the support of the D.C. National Guard on the grounds of the
Capitol?" His response was, "Yes." I said, "Okay. United States
and Army, Chief Sund is requesting support services the D.C.
National Guard. Are you denying his request?" Is what I said, and
the response to that was, "No, we're not denying the request. We
just need to understand what the plan is." By this point this
stuff is unfolding all over national world news. I'm deploying
every resource that I have available to include, not just the

eventually 1,000 officers that I had but all of the officers that I've got from the surrounding jurisdictions that were supposed to be here specifically for the D.C. streets. I also ended up sending them to the Capitol. I sent Prince George's County Police, Arlington County Police, Montgomery County police. I sent all of those agencies to assist at the United States Capitol ultimately the Virginia State Police as well when they arrived -when they arrived in the city. And the National Guard conversation at that point it never really moved beyond, "Well, we need a plan. We need to understand this and that. But meanwhile again I'm sending every available officer that I have to send. And at some point -- at some point later on and I don't know exactly when it occurred the National Guardsmen I believe the ones that we had on traffic post are the National Guard, those that we're not supposed to move east of 9th Street were the ones that later on in the day they eventually ended up sending over to the U.S. Capitol but that was hours after the insurrection started which was around some time in the 12:00 o'clock hour. This phone call was at 2:00 something and then by the time they pulled these National Guardsmen from traffic post it was several hours later.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Q: And sir, when you say "they pulled them", you're talking about National Guard, General Walker?

A: Yes. By the time that they were given the authority, the authorization it was several hours later. So Secretary

McCarthy at some point during the evening is all this stuff is unfolding he ended up here at MPD Headquarters in the JOC, in the command center where I was. And we went from having these discussions over the phone to now having face-to-face communication and coordination about what resources he could bring up there to assist and what was going on at the Capitol. I mean once he was engaged he was fully engaged but again that took -- that was several -- that was several hours on the back end.

Q: Yes, sir. Now sir, going back to the conference call that you talked about I have a couple of follow-up questions there. Do you know what time of day that call took place and who all was on the call?

A: It was after 2:00 p.m., and I don't know who all was on that call. It was like around 2:20 something, 2:22, 23 somewhere around there. It was 2:00 something. I know that Chief Sund was on there. I was on there obviously, Director Rodriguez he was on there. He was standing there with me. The Mayor was standing next to me. She was in close proximity. I just don't know who all the players on the U.S. Army side of things. I don't know -- I don't know all of the voices. I can only assume that General Walker at the minimum perhaps he was on there, but I don't know for certain who all was on that call.

Q: Okay. Do you know who arranged the call or who requested it?

A: I think Director Rodriguez, Chris Rodriguez I think he

organized it. I for some reason I remember him saying that he had Chief Sund and the other folks on a bridge called, but I'm not exactly sure which bridge they used. Obviously I'm dealing with a national crisis going on at the time so I'm not sure whose line was used to get everyone on the phone.

Q: Absolutely. Now sir, you mentioned some discussion about optics. I'd like to kind of delve a little deeper into that. Do you know --

A: Sure.

Q: -- who said it? The same words that the Secretary had used in this phone call with you, or what exactly was said?

A: Yeah. It was the same words, but it wasn't the Secretary this time. The Secretary we had talked a couple of times leading up to January 6th. As a matter of fact he was coordinating, calling, "Hey, we need to meet up on the 6th. Want to meet up on the 6th. I want to check in with you. I want to make sure you've got what you need." Those kind of things, but those conversations -- I was pretty familiar with his voice by that time. Like I said, on this particular call this after 2:00 p.m. call on the 6th it was somebody from the Army but it wasn't Secretary McCarthy. Again I just don't know who it was. But the speak if you will in terms of the issues are concerned with the National Guard's presence on the ground of the U.S. Capitol.

Q: All right. Sir, I'm having to pick your memory here

little bit, but do you remember exact words that were used regarding optics?

A: Optics, that's not a word I'm making up. That was the word that was used. It was, "We don't like the optics of that, boots on the ground on the U.S. Capitol." Those were things that were -- those are the things that stood out to me and like I said I was a little frustrated and I'm like, "You know, you have got to be kidding me." I was a little frustrated in my response to that, and just kind of thinking back on how everything was imposing you know here we are I have police officers on the front line, some with mountain bike helmet are out there doing what they can to protect our Capitol and we're calling on the assistance of the United States, or the D.C. National Guard and it seemed like -- it seemed like that's not happening the way that I think we should respond to a crisis in terms of, "Hey. Let's send the people. This is a now thing. We have to move with a sense of urgency. Turn on CNN let's see what's going on." It was again, "Well what's the plan?" "Stop the people from getting into the Capitol is the plan." You know what I mean?

Q: Yes, sir.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.0

21

22

23

24

25

A: So I didn't say that that was the plan but those were questions that were being posed, "What's the plan?" You know, "Was it the optics of having boots on the ground, on the ground the Capitol. That's not a good look." Those are specific words that were used.

- Q: Okay. How did you respond to the comment about optics?
- A: "Are you kidding me?" That was my response. "Are you kidding me?"

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

- Q: All right. Was there anything else said during that conversation you think we should be aware of?
- No. I mean to be quite frank find after that conversation which I felt my mind at that point was useless. I had more important things to be tending to, right? Like that point somewhere around there or in close proximity to that time we were getting called for people were down, and it was a medical emergency, shots of being fired. There's all kinds of stuff going on so to the extent that I could I sent every resource that I had available to assist again Capitol Police, and Capitol Police had to do whatever they could do to get the National Guard there. It wasn't really my fight to fight, you know what I mean? As it relates to what I am responsible for. It was really to try to help us all out by getting those additional bodies. I know we had at least 300 and some bodies that were here because those are the ones that MPD requested. So I knew about those, right? I knew we had 300 and something on traffic posts and handling crowd management. I knew that. So that's an additional 300 bodies that in my mind should have been immediately deployed to assist and help things out.
- Q: Okay. Got it, sir. And sir, you talked about your meeting later with Secretary McCarthy when he traveled to D.C.

That was at MPD Headquarters, correct?

1

2

3

4

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

- A: That's correct. He spent quite a bit of time with me.
- Q: Okay can you tell me about that meeting?

It was several meetings. So, I have a large, a couple of conferences here. We were literally in the room looking at a map of the Capitol, identifying where the fencing would go, identifying staging area for personnel who would be responding. Outside agencies. We were calling in outside agencies from as far away of as New Jersey. So we were just really in the room strategizing on what this response is going to look like a really kind of knocking out or identifying what the objectives were just in terms of getting the folks -- getting the Congress Members back in there so they could get the vote done. You know, we need to clear the Capitol. Granted he didn't have at that time he didn't have a presence of personnel there on the grounds of the Capitol but we were talking to through, "What is the strategy while the men and women are still out there fighting? Here's kind of what the strategy and the priorities have to be. So there was a lot of conversation around that. I remember him even at one point there was a question of Capitol Police about, "Who's paying for this fence?" And the Secretary of the Army said, "I'm paying for the fence." With his response to the question from the folks over at U.S. Capitol. So like I said once he was engaged, once they got approval or whatever happened at that point he was all in and he spent a lot of time in here with me, with other members

of my team just going over things. He had to leave and come back. I think he met with the Members of Congress, or he told me he was going to. He came back to MPD Headquarters. So we spent a lot of time together, and after the 6th like I said he really was going out of his way to try to make sure that we had everything -- everything that we needed or at least up to the point, well after if it was approval that he needed to see, once he got that he really went out of his way to try make sure that we had everything that we needed.

Q: Yes, sir. Now sir, do you remember about what time this series of meetings with the secretary began and I understand he left and then what time he came back?

A: It was over the course of many hours, sir. I would say probably somewhere after 4:00 or 5:00 o'clock somewhere. It went on into the night, late into the night. Congress was back in session by 8:00 o'clock but we still -- by that time, by the time Congress got back in session at 8:00 it was National Guardsmen I think that was deployed down like on the grounds of the Capitol around that time. So I'm sure he was -- he had to be here around that time in terms of the coordination that took place there, but we were here for many hours that night and even into -- really into the next day. He showed up with his team the next day and just trying to make sure that we were able to coordinate whatever needed to be coordinated for the next day and then obviously he spent a lot of time leading up to the inauguration and all the

coordination that needed to happen there. We attended several meetings over at the FBI. He attended one or two meetings over there with me and so we spent a lot of time together after this, but I can't give you a specific time when he got here.

- Q: No, I totally understand the fog of war kind of sets in at that point. Do you recall any of the other specific individuals that were present for any of these meetings?
 - A: From his side or are you just saying in general?
 - Q: In general.

- A: Yeah, I mean there were several members from my team.

 My Chief of Staff, gosh, one of my executive directors. One of my officers. I mean the Mayor was in the room at a certain point.

 Director Rodriguez he was in the room. I mean there is a lot going on in between my office and another office, and two conference rooms all on the same level. I mean we were in and out of these rooms at different points having discussion about what was going on in responses, and just everything that was happening that night.
- Q: Yes, sir. Understood. Sir, was any of the context of any of these discussions documented in any way?
- A: I can't say that they were really documented. I mean we had the map that we are looking at. Folks may have been making notes, that kind of thing just as reminders or something, but I mean I was really just kind of making decisions about things. I had people on my team who were around me and so forth, but I mean

there may be some notes around I'm just not familiar with.

- Q: Yeah, if you learn of any we'd certainly be interested in seeing those. Sir, were there any conversations with Acting Secretary Miller's between him and you on that day?
- A: I've never talked to Acting Secretary Miller. All of his conversations I would assume it was were with the Secretary at different points you know he would say, he was checking with SecDef that kind of thing. But he obviously needed privacy step out use my conference room at different points whatever, but he never -- I never talked directly to him, no.
- Q: Okay. Anybody else from the office of the Secretary

 Defense's staff or the Joint Chiefs of Staff that you're aware

 of?
- A: No. The people that were with the Secretary was just —
 they were Soldiers pretty much. Everybody was in uniform with the
 exception of the Secretary Defense I mean the Secretary of the
 Army and I think one instance of a lady who I think was his
 public information person or something but the next day she was
 in uniform. I wasn't sure if she was I wasn't sure what her
 role was to be quite honest but everybody else that was around
 him were all military personnel with uniforms on.
- Q: Okay, sir. I'm just checking my notes here to make sure I covered most everything. So far as what you requested on January 6th and what DoD provided how did that sync up? Was there anything that was denied, understanding it took a little bit to

role it all out?

2.0

A: No. I can't think of -- yeah, understanding that it did take time to roll it out that -- let me answer the question his way because the way that you're asking it you know they gave us what they gave us that we worked with what they gave us in those parameters. I would have liked to have had people east of 9th Street. I would have like -- because I had officers on traffic posts all the way up to 3rd Street. I would have liked to have had National Guardsmen covering that but I didn't get that. What I was told was I was going to receive these 300 and whatever it is and they can cover anywhere up to 9th Street. So at the end of the day did they give us Guardsmen? Yes, they they did give us Guardsmen but with parameters.

- Q: Understood. Understood. Can you tell me what time the additional support finally started arriving there in D.C.?
- A: It was late in the evening I know that. They were breaching the Capitol at just before 1:00 o'clock and I know it was hours, I'm not talking about an hour or a half hour, hours later by the time they got there. I just don't know exactly what that time was. I'm inclined to believe that it was definitely after 4:00. So they would have been in it what 3 hours at that point, and that's being generous. I really believe that it was later than that but I'll be lying if I told you exactly at this time. I just don't remember.
 - Q: Were you being kept up to date by Secretary McCarthy or

anybody else from his staff on the status?

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

2.0

21

22

23

24

25

A: Yeah he was -- like I said when he showed up here at MPD he was fully engaged. I'm getting you this. I'm going to have however many Guardsmen responding. He would say things like that obviously at that point I'm not physically on the ground. Where I could see the National Guardsmen on the west front was around the -- he was after the 8:00 o'clock hour I think when we started -when we got ready to start making arrests. I could see them on the camera from where I was but it seemed to me, and again I don't -- I'm sure that their people know exactly what time they arrived, but it seemed to me that in my discussions with him it was preparation, right? Like we're getting ready to do this or we're getting ready to do that. When they actually deployed like I said it was those men and women Guardsmen that were on the traffic post that they ultimately moved as the first contingency of National Guardsmen that were physically on the ground of the Capitol. That was the first group. I don't know about the time any other group got there, but at some point they took them from those traffic posts and they ended up deploying them here.

Q: Did he tell you or give you any reason for the delay?

A: No.

Okay. do you have any questions for this section?

BY

Q: Just a couple of follow-up questions. Chief, when you

received that call either on December 31st or January 1st from the Secretary of the Army that said he couldn't support you with D.C. National Guard but an alternate form of support, how did that make you feel?

1

2

3

4

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

A: I was disappointed actually because again I had only been acting. In fact I wasn't even -- I got sworn in on the 2nd. So this was -- this was kind of the lead up to that. The previous chief was transitioning out. I'm transitioning in. I was talking to the team. From what I'm told from the team like, "Hey, this is something that we always do. Don't worry about it. It's not a problem. You're going to have what you need." And here I am on the -- I'm really inclined to believe that it was on the 1st that we had this call the more that I think about it because the 1st would have been the holiday and that's why I would have been home that late in the afternoon. But when he called and he's not saying what my team has shared with me that he probably should be saying, like, "Hey, yeah you get the National Guard." I was a little bit disappointed behind that, and kind of coming in as the new Chief of Police of the Metropolitan Police Department and asking for the National Guard, being denied that for something that's critical as what we thought we would be doing, right? I mean we don't normally call in National Guard and outside law enforcement agencies just because we think we're going to have a regular First Amendment demonstration. We just don't do that. We're very good at what we do here in the net Metropolitan Police Department when it comes to First Amendment demonstrations. This obviously would something totally different from that but that being said, that wasn't what I was expecting to hear. So I mean I had to kind of -- I had to think like, "All right. If at the end of the day he says we're not getting them what are we going to do because these traffic posts still need to be covered? The problem is it still needs to happen. What am I going to do?" And I'm just thinking through different scenarios. So like I said I was very much disappointed because I -- the team has said again that we routinely get the support of the National Guard without an issue.

- Q: Okay. Thank you. You mentioned earlier that you received or somebody received a phone call from Chief Sund about 12:58ish asking for MPD help. How do you know that time? Are you basing that on something?
- A: No. I'm basing it on -- you said am I basing it on what?
- Q: What are you basing that timeline? How do you remember it was 1258ish?
- A: Because I had my Assistant Chief pull his call log and we were looking back at the call log at the call log to see what time we got the initial call from the U.S. Capitol Police to send our members -- to send our members to the grounds of the Capitol.
- Q: Chief, is there a possibility that we can get a sanitized version of that phone log for any DoD phone calls that may have been made?

A: Yeah. I'll work on something -- yeah I'm just going to say well and my lawyer is saying that answer for me but I was going to say we'll consult on that and we'll have to get back to you on that one.

: Thank you. That's exactly what I was going to say.

Thank you. That's a good enough answer. You said twice now that traffic control points were supposed to support the Capitol and you were unaware of what time that may have been. Do you have a general time? Was it afternoon? Evening? Something to maybe narrow it down a little bit?

A: My guess --

Q: [Inaudible.]

A: Yeah, my guess is sometime in the evening time, and I'm basing that on -- I'm basing that on we're having this phone call at 2:00 something where were talking about planning. If I recall correctly it was kind of cloudy out and a little rain that day. So it was getting dark at the 5:00 o'clock hour somewhere around there and I don't recall being there at that time. I don't recall them being there. So, I would say it was later on into the evening or afternoon, or late afternoon, early evening.

Q: Okay. Thank you. For the conference call that finally happened around 2:20, and I know that you perhaps were giving testimony on the Capitol and you said it was about 2:22 p.m., was Deputy Mayor Mitchell present for that phone call phone call by chance?

A: Yeah he was in the hall - I think it was in the hallway when we had that call. Like I said the Mayor, you know the Mayor's whole team was here and we're like standing outside of our command center. We were standing outside of their in the hallway wall while this call is going on. The Mayor was closest to me as well as Dr. Rodriguez, but Dr. Mitchell he was certainly here for an extended period that day. He was in the room when a lot of these conversations were happening as well as the current Deputy Mayor for Public Safety, Chris Gilbert was present for some of those discussions. So, there were a lot of people that were here.

Q: Okay. Thank you. My last question for you is we understand that the Secretary the Army at some point left MPD Headquarters and travel to the U.S. Capitol Police Command Center. Would you know about what time that may have happened?

A: I'm not sure what time that happened. The Secretary, like I said he was fully engaged and once he got engaged he was fully engaged. When he -- I remembered him he wanted to like go over to the Capitol and kind of see what was going on kind of thing. We were having this conversation about fencing and all this kind of stuff. So, I don't know what time he left but he left and came back. Left and came back kind of thing.

Q: Okay. Thank you. I'm done.

BY

Q: All right, Sir. We're almost done here. I just have a

few follow ups here. Are there any e-mails, or text messages, other documents relating to January 6th, the request for assistance that you have that we should review?

- A: Not that I'm aware of, sir. I think everything is in the memo that you guys pointed out. That's about the only thing that I'm aware of.
- Q: Okay. Yeah, if you do come across anything or anybody on your staff please have them forward it to us. Obviously you know what we're looking at here.
 - A: Okay.

- Q: Do you have any concerns with DoD's responsiveness to the request for assistance? From your office other than what we've already talked about?
 - A: Other than what we discussed, no.
 - Q: Okay. Is there --
- A: I probably should add -- I mean I think that -- I know that this is already been stated publicly, I've said it certainly. The fact that we have to -- or that we have been required to receive authority or approval from the Secretary of Defense a the cabinet level position for our local D.C. National Guard I think that's a shame and I certainly think that that's something that should be looked at and I'm sure it is at many different levels above my pay grade but what I experienced, what I saw on that day is probably the main reason why that should be looked into.

1 Q: Yes, sir. Actually you're touching on my very next question. According to media reports some have described the process as "archaic". So I was going to ask what your 2 recommendations are for resolving the issues that you 3 encountered? The Mayor should have the same authority as any **A**: governor. I mean we shouldn't have to jump through those hoops 4 basically when we're requested the same service that they would 5 request on our sister places right across the border in Maryland and Virginia. Yes, sir. Understood. 6 0: Yeah, I think that's kind of, you know, kind of cut and 7 dry as far as I'm concerned. Q: Understand, understand, sir. What information that we 8 have not addressed thus far regarding your staff's coordination with DoD on January 6th is important that we haven't talked about or having considered? Is anything that comes to mind? 9 A: No, I think that's it. You guys pretty much covered 10 everything. That's it in a nutshell. Okay. Let's see. Is there any additional information that you would like to provide? 11 **A**: No, sir. That's it. 12 Would you recommend it anybody specific that we should talk to? No, sir. 13 A: All right, sir. Do you have a questions for me? 0: 14 No, sir. What about any comments or concerns with the way we conducted this interview, understand telephonic is always 15 interesting? 16 I'm sorry, can you repeat that? No, sir. I was just asking if you have any comments or concerns about the way we conducted the interview? 17 A: No, sir. All right, sir. Well sir, if you do remember 18 anything else or you believe that may be relevant to our review please contact me. Your staff has my contact information. We'd 19 love to hear from you. Finally, in order to protect the integrity 2.0 of the review we ask that you not to discuss the matter under review or the questions that we have asked during this interview 21 with anyone other than your legal counsel or those present in the room. Any questions about that, sir? MR. CONTEE: No, sir. 22 23 All right, sir. The time is 3:12 p.m. and the 24 interview is concluded.

[The interview terminated at 3:12 p.m., March 17, 2021.]